Introduction by Ratner, Steven R.
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 28 Issue 3 
2007 
Introduction 
Steven R. Ratner 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the International Law Commons, and the National Security Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Steven R. Ratner, Introduction, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 539 (2007). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol28/iss3/1 
 
This Introduction is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal 
of International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
INTRODUCTION
Steven R. Ratner*
The articles in this symposium issue of the Michigan Journal of
International Law represent the product of a historic and path-breaking
conference held at the University of Michigan Law School in February
2007. The two-day meeting brought together an extraordinary array of
scholars and practitioners to examine closely the relevance of interna-
tional law for the gathering of intelligence by states. Although this long-
neglected topic has gained increased relevance since the use of more
controversial intelligence-gathering methods by the United States as part
of its "global war on terror," many of the legal issues are as old as the
craft of intelligence itself.
The challenge to international lawyers posed by intelligence gather-
ing is somewhat daunting: How can international norms, processes, and
institutions possibly play a role in regulating an activity that by its very
nature is so secret that states deliberately reveal very little about how
they carry it out? This obstacle has both a foundational and a practical
element. As a matter of the foundations of international law, we know
that customary international law emerges as states engage in a consistent
practice of activity over time and do so with a sense that the law obli-
gates or permits them to do so. Students of international law determine
custom by looking at such practice and attitudes, including the reac-
tions-protest or acquiescence-when certain states make claims about
what the law obligates or allows. A similar process is engaged with the
application and interpretation of treaties, where, if the treaty's text does
not provide a clear answer, we look to the ongoing practice of states as
the strongest evidence of its meaning.
With intelligence gathering as well as covert action-the other com-
ponent of that shadowy world-all the evidence of law is secret. How
can we possibly even know how states are interpreting a treaty, or what
they regard as a norm of custom, if they will not acknowledge what they
are doing or whether and how they believe it is legal? Even if a state has
an interest in acting according to law, it will not publicly reveal its inter-
pretation and in many cases will have reasons to avoid public protest of
claims by other states that it rejects.
Beyond the theory or doctrine of international law, as a practical mat-
ter it is hard to see how states will cooperate on creating an international
legal regime to govern intelligence activities. The construction of norms
and institutions is a cooperative exercise that assumes both a common goal
and a set of institutionalized processes to come to agreement, often
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(though certainly not always) transparent to the public. With intelligence
gathering, those states with the capacity to carry out this activity tend to
regard it as so central to their national survival that they might be unwill-
ing to cooperate on a global regime (though bilateral cooperation would
prove much easier). How can states even agree on what is allowed and
prohibited if they refuse to talk together about what they do?
These two challenges manifest themselves in numerous areas of in-
ternational law that should regulate intelligence gathering, from the use
of force to diplomatic immunity to human rights. For example, intelli-
gence gathering by one state in the territory of another could run afoul of
the UN Charter's ban on the use of force, as it can involve unconsented
breach of a state's territorial integrity. Similarly, the electronic eaves-
dropping that a number of states undertake of embassies and consulates
on their territory seems to violate the immunity of foreign missions that
is a core part of diplomatic law.
Despite these obstacles, the conference showed that international
law has functioned and can function to regulate intelligence gathering.
But of course it does not regulate intelligence gathering in the same way
it does other activities. Much of the regulation relies on the good faith of
lawyers within intelligence agencies in interpreting international law, a
trait that cannot be guaranteed when clients put strong pressures on them
for the "right" answers. Sometimes, particularly glaring acts will be
made public, and the reactions of states to the news will tell us some-
thing of their attitudes. The processes are manifold but are certainly
unlikely to involve courts, whether domestic or international.
In the papers that follow, readers are invited to explore the range of
issues that are part of this rich and underexamined subject. Jeffrey
Smith's keynote address examines the constraints that U.S. lawmakers,
at the time acting out of concern for international norms-or at least
ramifications-have put on the executive branch's intelligence-gathering
and covert action capacity.' He emphasizes the important role of lawyers
in ensuring fidelity to domestic and international law and cited repeated
failures of lawyers and policyrnakers to live up to those standards in re-
cent years. Simon Chesterman approaches intelligence gathering
broadly, addressing the rule of law in times of crisis.2 Chesterman under-
scores the pitfalls of allowing extra-legal measures in the face of such
crises or relying on ex post facto ratification of the measures. Charles
Garraway shows the complex interrelationship between international
human rights law and international humanitarian law, especially since
1. Jeffrey H. Smith, Keynote Address, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 543 (2007).
2. Simon Chesterman, Secrets and Lies: Intelligence Activities and the Rule of Law in
imes of Crisis, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 553 (2007).
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the declaration of the "global war on terror."3 And John Radsan offers a
provocative and original take on the netherworld between the legal and
illegal in which intelligence gatherers operate, showing that we all
must understand the shades of gray to see a role for law.4 Glenn Sul-
masy and John Yoo offer a more skeptical perspective, finding little
role for international law in the regulation of intelligence gathering and
arguing that such regulation could perversely lead to more frequent
conflicts or war.5
Judge James Baker's contribution brings home the hard work of the
lawyer advising policymakers and intelligence gatherers about the lim-
its of what they can do.6 He eloquently describes the imperatives facing
the United States-the balance between finding "actionable" intelli-
gence, on the one hand, and the protection of civil liberties under the
Constitution and a commitment to international law, on the other. He
shows how the lawyer must be scrupulous not to let either demand
cause him to offer legal advice that will seem to satisfy the client in the
short term but will prove harmful to U.S. interests in the long term.
Francesca Bignami's contribution concerns the interaction of intel-
ligence gathering with human rights, particularly the assaults upon
personal privacy that are part of some intelligence-gathering activities.7
Bignami advocates the "redesign" of transnational intelligence-sharing
networks with greater attention to the right to privacy, based on a Euro-
pean model of commonly shared, multilateral standards for the use and
transfer of intelligence information affecting individual privacy.
Finally, in discussing the links between state responsibility and in-
telligence gathering, Dieter Fleck offers a history of the approach to
espionage in various bodies of international law and the means by
which states could be held responsible for illegal acts.8
The editors of the MJIL have thus provided a unique contribution
to the study of international law. Many involved in intelligence gather-
ing will continue to resist calls for open scrutiny of their work, but
some public knowledge is necessary for a functioning democracy. We
3. Charles H.B. Garraway, State Intelligence Gathering: Conflict of Laws, 28 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 575 (2007).
4. A. John Radsan, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law, 28
MICH. J. INT'L L. 595 (2007).
5. Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Counterintuitive: Intelligence Operations and Interna-
tional Law, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 625 (2007).
6. James E. Baker, What's International Law Got to Do with It? Transnational Law
and the Intelligence Mission, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 639 (2007).
7. Francesca Bignami, Towards a Right to Privacy in Transnational Intelligence Net-
works, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 663 (2007).
8. Dieter Fleck, Individual and State Responsibility for Intelligence Gathering, 28
MICH. J. INT'L L. 687 (2007).
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can all hope that this is only the first of such conferences and that those
implementing states' intelligence-gathering capacities will pay heed to
the insights offered here.
